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Abstract
We introduce and investigate the ability of an attacker to
surreptitiously use an otherwise secure wireless network to
detect moving people through walls, in an area in which peo-
ple expect their location to be private. We call this attack
on location privacy of people an “exploiting radio windows”
(ERW) attack. We design and implement the ERW attack
methodology for through wall people localization that re-
lies on reliably detecting when people cross the link lines
by using physical layer measurements between the legiti-
mate transmitters and the attack receivers. We also develop
a method to estimate the direction of movement of a per-
son from the sequence of link lines crossed during a short
time interval. Additionally, we describe how an attacker may
estimate any artificial changes in transmit power (used as a
countermeasure), compensate for these power changes using
measurements from sufficient number of links, and still de-
tect line crossings. We implement our methodology on WiFi
and ZigBee nodes and experimentally evaluate the ERW at-
tack by monitoring people movements through walls in two
real-world settings. We find that our methods achieve very
high accuracy in detecting line crossings and determining di-
rection of motion.
1 Introduction
We investigate an attack to the privacy of the location of
people moving in an area covered by a wireless network.
People moving in an area covered by one or more wireless
networks, affect the way radio signals propagate. We demon-
strate that the presence, location and direction of movement
of people not carrying any wireless device can be “eaves-
dropped” by using the channel information of wireless links
artificially created by an attacker by deploying sensing de-
vices or receivers that can “hear” transmitters such as WiFi
access points (APs), composing the legitimate wireless net-
work. Signals from the transmitters passing through non-
metal external walls that allow radio waves to go through,
are analogous to light from light bulbs passing through glass
windows which an adversary can use to “see” where people
are in a building. Hence, we call this attack on location pri-
vacy of people an “exploiting radio windows” (ERW) attack.
Consider a building where security is important (e.g., an
Figure 1: Exploiting Radio Windows (ERW) attack example.
embassy) with a concrete exterior wall. One or more wire-
less networks may have been set up in this building to trans-
fer different types of data, including voice and video. We can
expect these networks to implement advanced data security
protocols to prevent eavesdropping of data. However, an at-
tacker can still deploy receivers outside the wall of the build-
ing to measure different parameters of the received radio
signals. By measuring the channel state information (CSI)
or received signal strength (RSS), for example, of the links
from the transmitters inside the building to the receivers de-
ployed, the attacker can monitor the movements of people
and objects inside the building in the area behind the wall in
Figure 1. The information about people’s movements can be
put to malicious use including planning a physical attack on
the personnel inside the building. On the contrary, law en-
forcement personnel can apply similar techniques in the case
of a hostage situation to track activity inside a large building
and plan their operation accordingly.
In this paper, we design and implement the ERW at-
tack methodology for through wall people localization. Our
methodology relies on reliably detecting when people cross
the link lines between the legitimate transmitters and the at-
tack receivers. We first develop a majority-vote based de-
tection algorithm that reliably detects line of sight (LOS)
crossing between the legitimate transmitter and the attack
receivers by comparing short-term variances in link channel
information with its long-term counterpart. We also develop
a method to estimate the direction of movement of a person
from the sequence of link lines crossed during a short time
interval. Next, we implement our methodology on WiFi and
ZigBee nodes and experimentally evaluate the ERW attack
by monitoring people movements through walls in two real-
world settings – a hallway of a university building separated
from the outside by a one-foot thick concrete wall, and a res-
idential house. When we use two WiFi 802.11n nodes with
normal antenna separation, or two groups of ZigBee nodes
as attack receivers, we find that our methods achieve close
to 100% accuracy in detecting line crossings and the direc-
tion of movement. We also find that our methods achieve
90− 100% accuracy when we use a single 802.11n attack
receiver.
To protect the privacy of the location information from
the ERW attack, the owner of the legitimate network may
choose to implement a countermeasure in which the trans-
mitters vary their transmit power during successive transmis-
sions. The artificial transmit power changes can be either
random or follow a pre-defined profile replicating the typical
channel variations introduced when a person crosses a link
line. This countermeasure is expected to introduce additional
variability in the received signal measured by the attack re-
ceivers which can be wrongly interpreted by the attacker as
caused by moving people or objects crossing the link lines.
In this paper, we demonstrate that an attacker who can mea-
sure a sufficient number of links can accurately estimate the
artificial transmit power change, compensate for it, and ulti-
mately locate people and monitor their movements. We base
our compensation strategy on the following intuition: An ar-
tificial transmit power change at a transmitter will impact
all the links between the transmitter and the attack receivers,
whereas genuine power changes due to human movement are
likely to impact only some of the links.
The ERW attack described in this paper is significantly
different than device-free localization1 (DFL) in that the
ERW attack is practical for large buildings, is stealthy be-
cause no transmitters are deployed by the attacker, and is
immune from jamming. DFL systems such as the ones
in [3, 11–13, 16, 23, 23, 24, 27] require dozens of radio
transceivers deployed throughout or on many sides of the
target area. Further, through-building DFL systems such
as [24, 28] assume the transmitted signal penetrates through
two external walls and any internal walls in between, and as
such have been tested only in buildings of small (18 - 42 m2)
size. In this paper, we show access to one side is sufficient for
an ERW attack, and it requires a signal from inside a building
to penetrate only one external wall. Other fingerprint-based
DFL systems [14, 19, 22, 25] require collection of training
data with a person in each possible location in the environ-
ment. In our ERW attack, we do not assume that an attacker
1in which people who are not carrying any radio transmitters are located
by a static deployed network.
has prior access to the inside of the building to be able to
perform such data collection. Further, to perform DFL, an
attacker must deploy some nodes which transmit, exposing
them to being detected and located by RF source localiza-
tion, while an ERW attack is stealthier in that purely passive
receivers are deployed by an attacker. Finally, DFL systems’
signals could be interfered with by a powerful jammer. In
the method in this paper, any transmitter in the building, in-
cluding a jammer, could be used as a source for ERW.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we describe the adversary model. In Section 3,
we formulate the methods used to detect link line crossings
and estimate changes in transmit power. We also describe
the method used to determine the direction of motion of the
person. The experimental setup is presented in Section 4. In
Section 5, we present the results of our experiments. Sec-
tion 6 discusses the previous research in the area of location
privacy attacks in wireless networks. Conclusions and direc-
tions for future work are given in Section 7.
2 Adversary Model
We make the following assumptions about the attacker2:
• The attacker is able to deploy multiple wireless sensing
devices within the transmission range of the legitimate
transmitter(s) outside the area being monitored. The at-
tacker is able to measure the physical layer information
(RSS and/or CSI) of the links between the transmitter(s)
and the attack receivers.
• The attacker does not have access to the content of the
packets transmitted by the legitimate network nodes.
• The attacker does not deploy any transmitters, nor does
it have any control over the legitimate transmitters.
However, it requires the legitimate transmitters to trans-
mit packets frequently to allow it perform the line cross-
ing detections.
• The attacker does not make any assumption regarding
the transmit power profile of the transmitters.
• The attacker nodes do not associate or interfere in any
manner with the transmissions of the legitimate trans-
mitter(s).
• The attacker may not know the precise location of the
transmitters or the arrangement of their antennas. How-
ever, we do assume that a transmitter is located well
inside the perimeters of buildings for network coverage
reasons ensuring that they do not lie between the people
(being localized) and the attack receivers.
3 Methodology
In this section, we first develop a methodology to detect
line crossings based on a majority vote for WiFi 802.11n
receivers. We also develop a method that uses a sequence
of line crossings to determine the direction of human move-
ment. Next, we present our approaches for estimating trans-
mit power change and its compensation, when the transmit
power is artificially changed by the owner of the wireless
2In this paper, we use the term attacker for anyone, whether malicious
or genuine, who is trying to localize humans.
transmitters, inside the a secure building, with the hope of
preserving location privacy. Last, we show how we adapt our
methodology for IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee attack receivers.
3.1 Line Crossing Detection
Many modern WiFi networks use the 802.11n standard,
in which transceivers are equipped with multiple antennas in
order to leverage the spatial diversity of the wireless channel.
While these multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems
provide high data rates, they also provide a rich source of
channel information to an adversary interested in localizing
people inside a building.
The 802.11n wireless standard uses the well-known or-
thogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) modula-
tion scheme, which encodes and transmits data across mul-
tiple subcarriers for each transmitter-receiver antenna pair.
When an 802.11n receiver receives a packet, it estimates the
effect of the wireless channel on each MIMO OFDM sub-
carrier for the purpose of channel equalization. Since this
channel state information (CSI), represented as a complex
gain for each subcarrier, is measured during the unencrypted
preamble of each WiFi packet, an adversary without legiti-
mate access to data on the network can still measure the CSI
for every packet.
We apply a windowed variance method for detecting
abrupt changes in the CSI for a WiFi link. Let H j,k(n) be
the magnitude of the signal strength for the jth transmitter-
receiver antenna pair and the kth OFDM subcarrier for the
nth packet. We define the windowed variance measurement
at packet n as follows. Let
¯Hwj,k(n) =
1
w
n
∑
i=n−w+1
H j,k(i), (1)
vwj,k(n) =
1
w− 1
n
∑
i=n−w+1
(H j,k(i)− ¯Hwj,k)
2
, (2)
and
swj,k(n) =
√
vwj,k(n), (3)
where, w is the number of previous CSI samples in the win-
dow. We define the subcarrier-average variance for packet n
for a given antenna pair j as
V wj (n) =
1
N ∑k v
w
j,k(n), (4)
where N is the number of subcarriers. We define the
subcarrier-average standard deviation for packet n as
Swj (n) =
1
N ∑k s
w
j,k(n). (5)
The quantities (4) and (5) represent the average CSI variance
and standard deviation across all subcarriers for antenna pair
j at packet n for a time window which includes the past w
packets. We track both (4) and (5) over a short-term time
window ws, and a long-term time window wl , allowing us to
compare the short-term and long-term statistics of the WiFi
link and detect line crossings.
A line crossing is detected for antenna pair j when
∑
n∈D
V wsj (n)−V
wl
j (n)> γ(n), (6)
where D is the most recent contiguous set of packets for
which V wsj (n)−V
wl
j (n)> 0 and the threshold γ(n) is defined
as
γ(n) =V wlj (n)+CS
wl
j (n). (7)
The constant C is included to allow the user to adjust the
trade-off between false alarms and missed detections.
In the case where there are more than two antenna pairs,
we take the majority vote between antenna pairs over the
short-term window to decide if a line crossing has occurred.
More specifically, when a receiver antenna detects a line
crossing, we count the line crossing detections for all the re-
ceiver antennas over the short-term window, ws. For a 3× 3
MIMO transmitter and receiver, this would mean comput-
ing a majority vote over nine measurements. When the ma-
jority of the receiver antennas detect a line crossing within
ws, we infer that a person has crossed the link line between
the transmitter and the receiver. We will show that this ma-
jority vote method improves the performance of our detec-
tor by decreasing false alarms and missed detections. We
decrease the false alarm rate further by combining tempo-
rally close detections together. More specifically, if we de-
tect a line crossing at time t1 for a transmitter-receiver pair
using the majority vote, we do not consider any other line
crossing detected in the time interval (t1, t1 +∆] for the same
transmitter-receiver pair, i.e., all line crossings detected in
the interval [t1, t1 +∆] are considered as a single line cross-
ing for a transmitter-receiver pair.
We note that our window-based variance method differs
from the method presented in [19, 26]. In [19, 26], Youssef
et al. compare recent window-based variance measurements
of RSSI at multiple WiFi links to measurements made dur-
ing a static calibration period when nobody is moving in the
area of interest. If a certain number of WiFi links within
the area of interest detect motion within a certain time inter-
val, a motion event is detected in the area of interest. Our
attacker does not know if and/or when people are moving in-
side of the building, and therefore cannot create calibration
measurements based on a static environment. Instead, we
compare a short-term window variance to a long-term win-
dowed variance. The long-term window allows us to capture
the behavior of the wireless links when the majority of mea-
surements are likely made while there is nobody crossing the
link line. Additionally, in the case of 802.11n, we exploit the
effect that line crossings have on each OFDM subcarrier and
MIMO antenna pair.
3.2 Determining Direction of Motion
If the adversary measures the CSI at multiple receivers, or
if a single receiver includes multiple antennas as is the case
with 802.11n, it is also possible to infer the direction that
a person is walking when line crossings are detected. The
direction of motion is inferred from the time differences be-
tween the line crossing detections at each receiver, in the case
of multiple receivers, or at each transmitter-receiver antenna
pair, when the receivers include multiple antennas.
Consider the scenario where the attacker arranges the
MIMO antenna array of an 802.11n receiver such that the
antennas are roughly parallel to a hallway as shown in Fig-
ure 2(a). The spatial order of the antennas with reference to
the hallway is known, and each transmitter-receiver antenna
is given an index according to its spatial order. Based on the
adversary model assumption that a transmitter is located well
inside the perimeter, the attacker, even without knowing the
precise location of the transmitter or the arrangement of its
antennas, may treat the antennas of the wireless transmitter
as if they are co-located and still achieve reliable results.
In the single WiFi receiver case, if a link crossing is de-
tected by majority vote for a given short-term window, we
find the line that best fits the set of points {(d j,n j) : j ∈ P},
where d j is the spatial index of antenna pair j representing
it’s location relative to the other links, n j is the packet in-
dex indicating when a detection occurred at antenna pair j
according to (6), and P is the set of antenna pairs ending
at the WiFi receiver which detected a line crossing during
the short-term window. The sign of the slope of this line
indicates the direction of motion. Figure 2 shows an exam-
ple which uses CSI measurements from three antennas at the
WiFi transmitter and three antennas at WiFi RX1 (9 antenna
pairs). In the case of two single-input single-output (SISO)
WiFi receivers, a similar method may be applied, but the two
spatial and packet indexes directly determine the line and its
slope.
3.3 Compensation of Transmit Power Change
In this subsection, we propose a methodology to detect
artificial transmit power changes (if any) and compensate for
the same. The signal strength for the jth transmitter-receiver
antenna pair and the kth OFDM subcarrier for packet n is
given by
H j,k(n) = Tx(n)+Gt +Gr−L j,k(n)+Ψ j,k(n), (8)
where Tx(n) is the transmit power of the transmitter at time
n, Gt and Gr are the transmitter and receiver antenna gains,
respectively, L j,k(n) is the path loss, and Ψ j,k(i) is a noise
term. The path loss includes all environmentally-dependent
terms, including large-scale loss, shadowing, and small-scale
fading. The noise term includes thermal noise, quantization
noise, and other measurement noise at the attacker receiver.
The attacker cannot depend on knowing the transmit
power or antenna gains. Instead, the attacker relies on
the difference between the subcarrier signal strength for
the packet n and the reference packet (n = 0) (the attacker
may update the reference packet periodically to account for
changes in the environment). This difference in subcarrier
signal strength is given by
h j,k(n), H j,k(n)−H j,k(0). (9)
From (8), we see that
h j,k(n) = tx(n)− l j,k(n)+ψ j,k(n), (10)
where
tx(n) = Tx(n)−Tx(0),
l j,k(n) = L j,k(n)−L j,k(0),
ψ j,k(n) = Ψ j,k(n)−Ψ j,k(0).
The subcarrier signal strength difference h j,k(n) above, con-
tains transmit power changes and channel-induced changes
between the nth packet and the reference packet, in addition
to noise.
The ideal situation from the attacker’s perspective would
be that there is no artificial change in transmit powers, and
that tx(n) = 0 for all j and k. In this ideal situation, the
subcarrier signal strength difference below is solely due to
changes in the channel.
h j,k(n) =−l j,k(n)+ψ j,k(n). (11)
Furthermore, people crossing the line between the transmit-
ter and receiver antennas typically cause a path loss change
more significant than noise, and thus the h j,k signal allows di-
rect inference of people’s motion. However, when the trans-
mitter artificially changes its transmit power, from (10), we
cannot directly attribute a large magnitude of h j,k to environ-
mental changes. In particular, if the magnitude of transmit
power changes is high enough, the magnitude of h j,k(n) will
be predominantly due to because of transmit power changes
at the transmitter. A transmitter could thus presumably pre-
serve location privacy by changing its transmit power fre-
quently.
We now propose a method that a smart attacker can use to
estimate and remove the artificial power changes and accu-
rately detect line crossings. In our method, the attacker esti-
mates the artificial transmit power change amplitude by cor-
relating measurements across all antenna pairs and all sub-
carriers, and removes the effect of transmit power changes
from the received signal strength measurements. We pro-
pose to use the median of hk, j(n) for all available transmitter-
receiver antenna pairs and corresponding subcarriers, as an
estimator of the artificial transmit power change, as shown in
the equation below:
tˆx(n) = median
{
h j,k(n)∀ j,k
}
. (12)
Our choice of this estimator is based on the following obser-
vations. First, we observe that tx(n) appears in the equation
for hk, j(n) for all j and k. This is because, any change in
transmit power affects measurements across all transmitter-
receiver antenna pairs and corresponding subcarriers simul-
taneously. Moreover, tx(n) is linearly related to l j,k and h j,k.
We also know that the change in the path loss l j,k is just as
likely to be positive as negative. Furthermore, any change
due to human movement will not affect all the links simulta-
neously.
In the absence of an artificial transmit power change, tˆx(n)
is likely to be close to zero, i.e., our estimator does not re-
quire us to detect whether or not there is an artificial transmit
power change for packet n.
The compensated signal strength for packet n, which we
denote ˆH j,k(n), is given by
ˆH j,k(n) = H j,k(n)− tˆx(n). (13)
Although the reference packet was sent with unknown trans-
mit power Tx(0), for n > 0, we consider Tx(n) to be the rel-
ative dB shift in transmit power compared to Tx(0). ˆH j,k(n)
essentially, is an estimate of the subcarrier signal strength if
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Figure 2: (a) Line crossing detection diagram. The attack receiver(s) measure channel state information from the legitimate
transmitter. The MIMO antenna array at the receiver(s) allows the adversary to count line crossings and determine direction of
motion. (b) Direction of motion is determined by fitting a line to the points created by the spatial indexes of the antennas which
detect a line crossing and the corresponding packet indexes of the detections. The sign of the slope of the fitted line indicates
the direction of motion.
there were no transmit power changes between the reference
packet and packet n.
It is clear that, any error in the estimation of the transmit
power changes amplitude will introduce additional noise in
the measurements. However, the dynamics of the signal are
still preserved and an attacker can use any variation in the
signal over a short time period in order to notice motion of a
person near the link line.
3.4 ZigBee Networks
The methodologies described above are also applicable
for IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee nodes. However, the ZigBee
nodes are generally equipped with a single antenna, so the
MIMO setup is not available. Moreover, ZigBee nodes do
not use OFDM for communication, so we use channel in-
formation from a single frequency channel (instead of av-
eraging across all subcarriers as in the case of OFDM) to
evaluate our methodologies. Furthermore, there is no tool to
get the complete CSI at the receiver. Instead, we rely on the
RSS value obtained from the receiver hardware. Thus, in the
case of ZigBee we set H j,k(n) to the RSS value measured
in decibel units for the jth transmitter-receiver antenna pair
for packet n, also k = 1,∀ j as we have measurements from a
single channel only.
In order to create spatial diversity we use three closely
located ZigBee receivers together to form a group as de-
scribed in Section 4. We detect line crossings by applying
our majority vote approach on the three links formed be-
tween the transmitter and the three receivers in the group.
We detect direction of motion using two groups of receivers
and observing sequence of groups crossed over a short time
window. We estimate and compensate for artificial transmit
power changes (if any) by applying the methods described in
Section 3.3, and utilizing the fact that any change in transmit
power affects all receivers simultaneously across all groups.
4 Experiments
In this section, we describe the experimental setup. Sec-
tion 4.1 describes the tools we use to measure the wireless
channel, Section 4.2 describes the transmit power changes
we apply, and Section 4.3 describes two real-world experi-
mental deployments.
4.1 Tool Description
We use the following tools to measure the wireless chan-
nel and detect line crossings.
4.1.1 WiFi
We use laptops with Intel 5300 NICs that have three-
antenna MIMO 802.11n radios. We use the CSI Tool [9],
that has been built for these radios, to get channel state in-
formation from the WiFi transmitter. The CSI tool extracts
802.11n channel state information for 30 subcarrier at each
antenna pair. Since we use three antennas at each node
for communication, for each transmitter-receiver pair, we
have 3× 3 = 9 links each with 30 subcarrier groups. We
use two kinds of antenna separations - in the normal case
(WiFi NORM), we place the antennas 6 cm apart, in the
other case (WiFi SEP), we use a larger antenna separation
of 30 cm. The increased separation is accomplished by con-
necting the antennas to the Intel 5300 NIC with standard RF
cables that are long enough to provide up to 30 cm separa-
tion. We program the transmitter to transmit packets at a rate
of 10 Hz which is similar to beacon frame rates of a standard
wireless access point. The attack receivers use the CSI Tool
to obtain channel state information from the received packets
which in turn is used to detect line crossings as described in
Section 3.1.
4.1.2 ZigBee
For the ZigBee experiments, we use Texas Instrument
CC2531 USB dongles [21], which are equipped with low-
power, IEEE 802.15.4-compliant radios operating in the 2.4
GHz ISM band. The transmission frequency in this case is
12 Hz. A laptop is used to process the measured data at the
attack receivers. There is no tool to obtain the CSI informa-
tion in the case of ZigBee nodes. Therefore, we use the RSS
value (in dBm) measured by the receiver hardware for our
analysis, as described in Section 3.4.
4.2 Transmit Power Variations
We consider three different settings of transmit power
variations for our experiments:
(a) TX NORMAL: In this case, the transmitters transmit
with fixed transmit power and variations in RSS are due
to person movement and noise only.
(b) TX LINECROSS: In this case, we simulate the effect of
transmit power change by modifying received data ac-
cording to a power profile that replicates typical signal
attenuation introduced by a person crossing the link line.
We randomly select different time points in the measure-
ments to introduce effect of transmit power change.
(c) TX RANDOM: Here, we experimentally implement or
simulate the scenario where the transmitter may use a
different power level for each transmission by randomly
selecting from a predefined set of power levels sup-
ported by the hardware. For ZigBee nodes, we program
the transmitter(s) to change its transmit power at each
transmission by randomly selecting one among four pre-
defined transmit power levels, i.e., +4.5 dBm, −1.5
dBm, −6 dBm, and −10 dBm. However, we are unable
to program the random power changes in WiFi nodes and
hence, we simulate these power changes.
While simulating effects of transmit power change we
rely on the fact that any change in the transmit power
at a time instant is observed across all subcarriers for all
transmitter-receiver antenna pairs in case of WiFi and across
all receivers in case of ZigBee at the same instant and we
change the received signal parameters accordingly. We also
add a zero mean Gaussian random variable (with standard
deviation 0.67) to each H j,k(n) measurement, in addition to
the the transmit power change tx(n), to account for errors due
to environmental noise.
4.3 Experimental Deployments
We evaluate our methodologies in two different real world
settings.
4.3.1 University Hallway
We choose a hallway inside a university building as the
area being monitored (Figure 4(a)). The hallway is adjacent
to a 30 cm thick and 3.5 m tall rebar-reinforced concrete
boundary wall (Figure 4(b)). We note that this type of a
wall causes significant RF attenuation at WiFi frequencies
and represents a worst-case scenario among typical exterior
walls for our purposes [20]. We place the attack receivers
outside the boundary wall parallel to the hallway approxi-
mately 1 m away from the wall.
For the WiFi experiment, we deploy one transmitter in-
side the building across the hallway, and two attack receivers
separated by 3 m outside the concrete wall (Figure 3(a)).
Similarly, for the ZigBee network, we deploy one transmit-
ter across the hallway and six receivers outside the boundary
wall. The attack receivers are placed in two groups of three
nodes each, with the distance between the groups being 3
m (Figure 3(a)). Nodes in the same group are almost 30 cm
apart. We perform both TX NORMAL and TX RAND ex-
periments with the same ZigBee setup. We also experiment
with three different transmitter locations in case of ZigBee.
During the experiment, a person walks back and forth
along a predefined path (route in Figure 3(a)) along the corri-
dor between the transmitter and the attack receivers. With the
help of a metronome, the person walks at a constant speed of
0.5 m/s. We collect over 12,000 data samples for WiFi and
over 20,000 data samples for ZigBee in this experiment. In
our evaluation, we use ws = 4 s (short time window), wl = 40
s(long term window), and ∆ = 4 s (Section 3.1).
4.3.2 Residential House
In this experiment, we monitor two sides of a residen-
tial house (Figure 3(b)) to detect people movement. We per-
form two sets of experiment with the WiFi nodes. In the
first experiment (House 1), we place the WiFi transmitter in
a corridor centrally located inside the house and two WiFi
receivers with normal antenna separation (WiFi NORM) in
the backyard of the house outside the external wall as shown
in the Figure 3(b). The receivers are placed approximately 1
m away from each other. For the second experiment (House
2), we use two WiFi receivers with larger antenna separation
(WiFi SEP) and place one of them in the backyard and the
other outside the front entrance. The transmitter is placed in
the same position as in experiment House 1.
For the ZigBee network, we place two groups of re-
ceivers, each group with three nodes, on either side of the
house outside the external walls. As shown in Figure 3(b),
the ZigBee groups 1 & 2 are placed outside the front en-
trance, and groups 3 and 4 are placed in the backyard, ap-
proximately 1 m away from the walls. Nodes in the same
group are almost 30 cm apart while the inter-group distance
on either side being at least 1 m. The ZigBee transmitter is
placed inside the house co-located with the WiFi transmitter.
We perform two sets of experiments with the same network
settings - in one experiment the ZigBee transmitter transmits
with fixed transmit power of +4.5 dBm (TX NORMAL),
in the other experiment the transmitter is programmed to
vary its transmit power randomly with each transmission
(TX RANDOM).
During these residential experiments, a person walks in-
side the house at normal speed back and forth first near the
front entrance of the house (route 1 in the Figure 3(b)), and
then in the living room which is near the rear end of the
house (shown as route 2 in the Figure 3(b)). Finally, the per-
son makes a few rounds inside the house as shown in route
3 in the Figure 3(b). We collect over 10,000 data samples
for each set of ZigBee and WiFi experiments. We video
record the line crossings to test the accuracy of our detec-
(a) University hallway. (b) Residential.
Figure 3: Network layouts. We show maps of the University Hallway and the Residential House and mark the location of the
legitimate transmitter(s) and the attack receivers. We also highlight the route(s) followed by the walking person.
(a) Transmitter deployment (b) Attack receiver deployment
Figure 4: Experimental Setup for ZigBee (University Hallway).
Table 1: Detection Accuracy (Hallway).
Hallway Accuracy Error (sec)
Experiment: FA% MD% Min Max Mean
WiFi NORM 0 1.92 0.03 2.73 0.79
WiFi SEP 0 0 0.27 2.37 1.22
ZigBee 0 1.02 0.27 2.37 1.22
Table 2: Detection Accuracy (House).
House Accuracy Error (sec)
Experiment: FA% MD% Min Max Mean
WiFi NORM 0.043 5.70 0.29 2.78 1.06
WiFi SEP 0.005 4.35 0.03 1.82 0.56
ZigBee 0.004 0.49 0.10 3.55 1.63
tion method against ground truth. For the residential experi-
ments, we use ws = 2 s (short time window), wl = 20 s (long
term window) and ∆= 4 s (Section 3.1). We use smaller win-
dow sizes for detection of line crossings as the person walks
at a faster speed as compared to the University Hallway ex-
periments.
5 Results
We evaluate the performance of the ERW attack in terms
of false alarm and missed detection rates. False alarm (FA)
rates are calculated as the number of line crossings wrongly
detected by the system over the number of sample points.
Missed detection (MD) rates are calculated as the number of
actual line crossings not detected by the system over the total
number of actual line crossings.
5.1 Detection of Line Crossing
In this section, we present the accuracy of detection of
line crossings using the methodology as described in Section
3.1.
5.1.1 University Hallway
Table 1 lists the results obtained in the University Hallway
experiment using our majority vote detection. We achieve al-
most 100% detection rate with few false alarms and missed
detections. Using a WiFi 802.11n receiver with normal an-
tenna separation, we get zero false alarms and only 1.92%
missed detections. We compare the detected crossing times
with those in the recorded video footage of the experiment
and find that we can detect the crossing times with an aver-
age error of 0.79 s, with minimum and maximum errors of
0.03 s and 2.73 s respectively.
We obtain zero false alarms and missed detections when
using a 802.11n WiFi receiver with a large spatial separation
between antennas, the mean error in this case being 1.22 s.
For ZigBee, using a group of three closely located receivers,
we get a 2.66% false alarm rate and a 1.67% missed detec-
tion rate in line crossing detection with an average error of
1.22 seconds. We use two groups of receivers and exper-
iment with three different transmitter locations in case of
ZigBee. We obtain the above results by averaging over all
transmitter location and receiver group pairs.
Note that while computing the errors as compared to the
ground truth, we consider the line connecting the centroid of
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Figure 5: All links are not equally sensitive to movement
- RX1 and RX3 measure high short term variations in link
RSS corresponding to person crossings (time intervals [113
s - 116 s] and [128 s - 131 s]). Such a distinct high variation
region is not present in link to RX2.
transmitter antenna locations (or the transmitter location in
case of ZigBee) and the centroid of the receiver antenna lo-
cations (or the centroid of the receiver locations in the group
in case of ZigBee) as the representative link line.
5.1.2 Residential House
We present the detection accuracy of the Residential
House experiment in Table 2. We achieve greater than
94% detection accuracy with a 0.043% false alarm rate
while using WiFi receivers with normal antenna separation
(WiFi NORM). With larger antenna separation (WiFi SEP)
the accuracy is above 95% with a 0.005% false alarm rate.
The mean error in detection of line crossings is 1.06s in case
of WiFi NORM, the same being 0.56s for WiFi SEP.
For ZigBee, we achieve above 99% accuracy in detec-
tion with a false alarm rate of 0.004% only. The mean time-
of-crossing estimation in this case is 1.63 s. Note that dur-
ing this experiment, we placed one group of ZigBee nodes
(group 2) directly in front of the metal-plated entrance door.
The packet reception rates for receivers in this group are
much lower than the receivers in the other groups. Also, per-
haps due to attenuation through the door, the RSS measure-
ments made by this group are more noisy than those made
by the other groups, leading to further degradation in perfor-
mance. The missed detection rate for this group is almost
30%, about 60 times more than the average missed detection
rate of other groups (results presented in Table 2 are aver-
aged over the other three groups). Thus, we conclude that,
although an ERW attack can penetrate concrete and brick
walls, metallic structures in the line of sight path of the radio
signals degrades the detection accuracy significantly.
5.2 Determining Direction of Motion
5.2.1 University Hallway
In this section, we present the accuracy we achieve in
detecting the direction of motion in the experiment where
we monitor the university hallway. In this experiment, the
corridor was crossed by a moving person an equal number
of times in either direction. We achieve 100% accuracy in
detecting direction of movement on either side of the corri-
dor while using two WiFi receivers or two groups of ZigBee
nodes using the method described in Section 3.2.
We also achieve an accuracy as high as 90.38% in detect-
ing direction of motion with only a single WiFi 802.11n re-
ceiver by increasing the spatial separation of the MIMO an-
tennas. The accuracy with a single WiFi receiver with stan-
dard antenna separation is 59.62%, which is slightly better
than guessing the direction of motion.
5.2.2 Residential House
For the experiment performed in the residential house we
again achieve 100% accuracy in detection while using two
WiFi receivers with standard antenna separation (experiment
House 1) or two groups of ZigBee nodes on either side of
the house. Individual detection accuracy of the two WiFi
receivers (with standard antenna separation placed on the
same side of the house as in experiment House 1) used are
100% (RX1) and 68% (RX2) respectively. Detection ac-
curacy with spatially separated antennas for these receivers
(when they are placed on opposite sides of the house as in
experiment House 2) are 96% (RX1) and 52.6% (RX2) re-
spectively. These results differ from the University Hallway
experiment where we get better accuracy in detecting direc-
tion of movement while using large spatial separation be-
tween antennas as compared to using normal antenna sepa-
ration. The degradation in accuracy with antenna separation
in Residential House experiment may be due to the fact that
during the House 2 experiment, walking speed of the person
was about 20% faster as compared to the House 1 experi-
ment with normal antenna separation, hence crossing times
for individual antennas overlapped with each other in some
cases.
To summarize, our results indicate that an ERW adver-
sary should use two WiFi receivers or two groups of ZigBee
nodes at each side in order to detect direction of motion ac-
curately. It is possible to achieve very high accuracy even
with a single WiFi receiver in some cases (e.g. RX1 in ex-
periments House 1 and House 2), however the results depend
on the environment and need further investigation.
5.3 Advantages of Majority Vote
In this section, we show how our majority vote approach
helps overcome inherent uncertainties in wireless links. All
wireless links are not equally sensitive to motion occurring
in their vicinity and the sensitivity varies with link fade level
along with other factors. For example, Figure 5, plots the
RSS for the three ZigBee receivers belonging to group 1 used
in the Residential House experiment for a time interval dur-
ing which the person crossed in front the group two times.
For RX1 and RX3, the overall RSS variance is very small.
When the person crosses the link line, she causes high short
term variation of the RSS, as can be seen during time inter-
vals [113 s - 116 s] and [128 s - 131 s]. Thus, one can infer
link crossing times monitoring for these high short term vari-
ations in RSS for these links. However, the link to RX2 has
very low mean RSS value with high variance overall. This
link does not show clear short term high variance region cor-
responding to actual link line crossings as compared to RX1
or RX3. Hence, a line crossing detection method that relies
only on the link to RX2 will perform poorly.
Since it is not possible for an adversary to know be-
forehand whether a link is good or bad for detecting LOS
crossings, he relies on correlation among multiple closely
located links and infers a line crossing only when majority
of these closely located links indicates a crossing. In our
experiments, 3×3 = 9 links between the MIMO transmitter-
receiver antenna pairs are considered for majority vote in the
WiFi case, and groups of 3 single-antenna receivers in the
ZigBee case. Figure 6 shows one scenario where our ma-
jority vote algorithm helps get rid of some false alarms and
missed detections due to one bad WiFi link (for clarity we
show three out of the nine links) from the University Hall-
way experiment. As can be seen the link in Figure 6(b), fails
to detect a line crossing that occurs around 100 s, however
the other two links (Figure 6(a) & Figure 6(c)) detect the
crossing and a majority vote among these three links detects
the crossing at that time (Figure 6(d)). Similarly, we see that
the link in Figure 6(b) flags a false alarm at 180 s but the
other two links do not indicate any crossing. Hence again
the majority vote gets rid of the false alarm at time 180 s
(Figure 6(d)), thereby improving the overall accuracy of the
system.
We summarize our findings as follows - a single wireless
link suffices in some cases in detection of line crossings be-
tween a transmitter and a receiver, however the results are not
always reliable due to inherent uncertainties in link sensitiv-
ity to object movements. We can improve accuracy and re-
liability by correlating detections across multiple co-located
links using a majority vote approach. Our results confirm
that we can get rid of most of the false alarms and missed de-
tections caused by a bad link by applying the majority vote
based detection method.
5.4 Compensation for Transmit Power
Change
In this section, we show how transmit power changes
(random or strategic) affect line crossing detection accuracy
and how our compensation method nullifies the effect of such
power changes.
Figure 7(a) shows the effect of random transmit power
changes on line crossing detection for a WiFi link between a
single transmitter-receiver antenna pair that is crossed three
times by a moving person. The top figure corresponds to the
case when there is no transmit power change. This figure
clearly shows distinct short time periods of high variance in
the CSI corresponding to the times when the person crosses
the link. However, transmit power change masks these dis-
tinct short term variance regions and renders line crossing
detection ineffective as can be seen in the figure in the mid-
dle. The bottom figure plots the CSI for the same link after
compensating for the transmit power changes as described in
Section 3.3. Clearly, our compensation method almost nul-
lifies the masking effect of transmit power changes and the
attacker can detect three line crossings (high short term vari-
ance region) from the compensated signal.
Similarly, Figure 7(b) shows how strategic power changes
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Figure 6: The majority vote over transmitter-receiver antenna pairs reduces false alarms and missed detections. (a),(b), and (c)
show the results of the windowed variance based line crossing detection for three antenna pairs using Wifi. In (d), we see that
the majority vote eliminates false alarms and missed detections.
can be used to simulate link line crossings, and how our com-
pensation method eliminates these artificial variations. The
top figure plots the RSS in dBm for a ZigBee link that is
crossed during the time interval 856-860 s. The figure in
the middle shows one additional line crossing (high variance
region) introduced in the link by strategic transmit power
changes during time interval 838-841 s. However, as seen
from the bottom figure, our compensation method gets rid of
the false alarm introduced by strategic power change and we
can detect the original line crossing from the compensated
signal.
In the Figures 8 and 9, we show false alarms and missed
detections induced by transmit power changes and the accu-
racy of our compensation method. In the figures, NORMAL
corresponds to the case when the transmitter transmits with
fixed transmit power, CRS is when strategic power changes
are introduced in the data using TX LINECROSS simula-
tion, CRS CMP corresponds to the results when we ap-
ply our compensation method on TX CRS. Similarly, RND
shows results when the transmitter is changing its transmit
power randomly with each transmission, while RND CMP
is the corresponding compensation results. Note that the
owner of the legitimate transmitter has full control over the
transmitter node and can randomly select the periodicity with
which to introduce transmit power changes in case of the
TX LINECROSS experiment. We present results for one
such simulated scenario where the owner randomly selects
a time period between 3− 10 seconds to change transmit
power according to a profile that mimics typical channel vari-
ation introduced by a person crossing the link line.
We see that transmit power changes (for both
TX LINECROSS and TX RANDOM experiments) in-
troduce significant false alarms and missed detections
while using either WiFi (with or without spatially separated
antennas) or ZigBee nodes. As an example, in the University
Hallway experiment, a strategic transmit power change at
the WiFi transmitter increases the missed detections rate
from 1.92% to 32.69% and the false alarms rate from 0%
to 0.199% when using a WiFi receiver with normal antenna
separation. However, our compensation method gets rid
of all the additional false alarms and missed detections.
Similarly, in the Residential House experiment, for ran-
dom power changes at the ZigBee transmitter, the missed
detections rate increases to 31.37% from 0.94% and the
false alarms rate increases to 0.429% from 0.003% but our
compensation method brings down the missed detection and
false alarm rates to only 0.94% and 0.006%, respectively.
Using Equation 12, we can estimate the transmit power
change amplitude accurately in 98% cases if we allow an
error margin of ±2 dB.
To summarize our findings, transmit power changes
(strategic or random) increase the false alarm and missed
detection rates significantly. However, using our compensa-
tion method, an attacker can accurately estimate the transmit
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Figure 7: Measured CSI and RSS (top) without and (middle) with TX power change; and (bottom) after compensation, which
nullifies the effect of TX power change.
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power change amplitude and compensate for the same to get
rid of most the adverse effect caused by such changes and
still sense people location and motion with high accuracy.
5.5 Detection with Varying Transmission Rate
ZigBee applications in modern facilities use different
transmission rates for communication. In this section, we
show how detection accuracy varies when the transmission
rate for the ZigBee transmitter is lowered. We use the data
from TX NORMAL for both the University Hallway and
Residential House experiment to simulate the effect of lower
transmission rate. Note that the original transmission rate is
approximately 12 Hz. We simulate three additional trans-
mission rates - 6 Hz, 4 Hz and 2 Hz respectively from the
original data. Figure 10 shows the results of our simulation.
We find that the overall detection rates decrease with lower
transmission rates. For the transmission rate of 6 transmis-
sions/second, accuracy of the detector is over 98% for the
University Hallway experiment and over 96% for the Resi-
dential House experiment. These results are similar to what
we observe for original transmission frequency of 12 Hz.
The accuracy is worst for transmission frequency of 2 Hz
with the detection rate being as low as 71% for the Residen-
tial House experiment. For the transmission rate of 4Hz, the
detection rate degrades to 87% in the University Hallway
experiment, although it remains above 96% for the Residen-
tial House experiment. We do not see any noticeable change
in the false alarm rates with varying transmission rate.
We summarize our findings as follows: Detection accu-
racy with ZigBee nodes decreases as transmission rate is
lowered. For an ERW attack to succeed with high accu-
racy, the transmission frequency must be at least 6 transmis-
sions/second.
6 Related Work
Preserving the privacy of the location of mobile devices in
wireless networks has been object of intense research [5, 7].
Location represents an important private information that
can be used by malicious attackers for serious privacy vio-
lations and potentially dangerous attacks. The work in [18]
presents an evaluation of the privacy and security of wireless
tire pressure monitoring systems. It shows that eavesdrop-
ping these systems is possible through their static identifiers
even at a distance of 40 m.
Other works have demonstrated that communicating
wireless devices leak the current and past location of people
carrying these devices. In [17], the authors show that dis-
tance bounding protocols [2] can leak distance and location
information to an attacker overhearing the communication
between the prover and the verifier to such an extent as to
allow the attacker to estimate his own position relative to the
two devices. They also introduce a location private distance
bounding protocol that protects against malicious provers,
passive eavesdroppers, and attackers trying to actively initi-
ate a distance bounding session. Fu et al. [6] describe a sys-
tem that can reveal the locations of WiFi-enabled mobile de-
vices within the coverage area of a single high-gain antenna.
By knowing the location and/or the maximum transmission
range of the APs, an eavesdropper can set up a high-gain an-
tenna to sniff the traffic between the victim mobile device and
the APs on all the available wireless channels and estimate
the position of the mobile device. The work in [10] pro-
poses three countermeasures to improve the location privacy
in wireless networks, i.e., anonymize the identity of the de-
vice by frequently changing its pseudonym during communi-
cations (as in [8]), un link different pseudonyms of the same
device with silent periods between different pseudonyms, re-
duce the transmission range of the devices through power
control to minimize the number of APs that can collaborate
to localize the devices’ location (the precision to which a
mobile device can be located depends on how many APs can
hear from the device [1]).
The works focusing on location privacy typically as-
sume that the victims of the attack are carrying a wireless
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Figure 10: Detection accuracy with varying transmission rates (ZigBee).
device (e.g., a mobile phone, RFID tag, low-power radio
transceiver) that is actively communicating with the sur-
rounding network infrastructure (e.g., WiFi APs, RFID read-
ers, other radio transceivers). The work in [4] presents a
through-walls passive WiFi radar system. In it, a receiver is
situated outside the target building and a Wi-Fi AP placed in-
side the building and having a narrow-beamwidth directional
antenna is used as transmitter. The signal received by the
passive radar detector is then used to create a range-Doppler
surface and detect a moving target. Our work is complemen-
tary to [4] because through wall radar systems have limited
range due to direct signal interference. and further, as they
are based on transmission, could be detected by source lo-
calization or counteracted by jamming. Other systems lo-
calize people by measuring the change in RSS of links trav-
eling across an area where several WiFi APs or ZigBee ra-
dio transceivers are deployed. In the case of Wi-Fi based
passive localization systems [19], a radio map of the envi-
ronment is created by having a person standing at different
locations while recording the RSS of all the links. This re-
quires access to the target area for an initial calibration of the
system. For radio tomographic systems [24], accurate local-
ization of people requires a high density deployment of radio
transceivers on all sides of the target area.
In this work, we demonstrate that the presence, location
and movements of people not carrying any wireless device
can still be eavesdropped by measuring the RSS of the links
between the devices composing the legitimate network and
few receivers positioned outside the target area. This can be
achieved without requiring a complex network infrastructure
or previous access to the target area for an initial calibration.
In [15], the authors propose a method to detect an attack to
a radio tomographic system in which some of the deployed
radio transceivers are maliciously reprogrammed to change
their transmit power. Our work is different in that we pro-
pose a method capable of correctly estimating the amplitude
of the transmit power changes implemented by the legitimate
devices as a countermeasure to the EPL attack. This enables
reconstructing the true dynamics of the RSS signals and es-
timate people’s locations. Moreover, in our work we do not
make any assumption on the number of transmitters chang-
ing their transmit power and on the periodicity and amplitude
of such changes.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We investigated the ability of an attacker to surreptitiously
use an otherwise secure wireless network to detect mov-
ing people through walls. We designed and implemented
an attack methodology for through wall people localization
that relies on reliably detecting when people cross the link
lines by using physical layer measurements between the le-
gitimate transmitters and the attack receivers. We also de-
veloped a method to determine the direction of movement
of a person from the sequence of link lines crossed dur-
ing a short time interval. Additionally, we described how
an attacker may estimate any artificial changes in transmit
power (used as a countermeasure), compensate for these
power changes using measurements from sufficient number
of links, and still detect line crossings. We implemented our
methodology on WiFi and ZigBee nodes and experimentally
evaluated the ERW attack by monitoring people movements
through walls in two real-world settings. We found that our
methods achieve close to 100% accuracy in detecting line
crossings and the direction of movement, when we use two
WiFi 802.11n nodes with normal antenna separation, or two
groups of ZigBee nodes as attack receivers. We also found
that our methods achieve 90− 100% accuracy when we use
a single 802.11n attack receiver.
Future work must develop more sophisticated protocols
to prevent person location information leakage. Device hard-
ware enhancements may be necessary for this purpose.
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